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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Adrian Peter Stock appeals from the District Court‟s 
order denying his motion to dismiss his indictment under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B) for failure to 
state the offense of transmitting a threat in interstate 
commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).  Stock argues that the 
term “threat” means the expression of an intent to inflict 
injury in the present or future, and that the statement 
attributed to him does not meet that definition.  For the 





 On August 3, 2011, Stock was charged in a one-count 
indictment that alleged: 
“On or about February 9, 2011, in the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, the defendant, 
ADRIAN PETER STOCK, did knowingly and 
willfully transmit in interstate commerce a 
communication containing a threat to injure the 
person of another, that is, the defendant, 
ADRIAN PETER STOCK, posted a notice on 
Craig‟s List, an Internet web site, that contained 
the following statements, among others, 
i went home loaded in my truck 
and spend the past 3 hours 
looking for this douche with the 
expressed intent of crushing 
him in that little piece of shit 
under cover gray impala 
hooking up my tow chains and 
dragging his stupid ass down to 
creek hills and just drowning 
                                              
1
 Because our consideration of a challenge under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B) is confined 
to the facts alleged within the indictment, our factual 
background is similarly circumscribed.  See United States v. 
Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 595-96 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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him in the falls.  but alas i can’t 
fine that bastard anywhere . . . i 
really wish he would die, just 
like the rest of these stupid 
fucking asshole cops.  so J.K.P. 
if you read this i hope you burn 
in hell.  i only wish i could have 
been the one to send you there. 
In violation of Title 18, United States Code, 
Section 875(c).” 
App. at 50. 
 5 
 Stock moved to dismiss his indictment under Rule 
12(b)(3)(B)
2
 for failure to state an offense, arguing that his 
alleged statement did not constitute a threat under § 875(c) as 
a matter of statutory interpretation, but disclaiming any First 
                                              
2
 Stock actually moved to dismiss his indictment under 
both Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2) and Rule 
12(b)(3)(B).  App. at 53.  Stock may have cited Rule 12(b)(2) 
because his argument that his indictment fails to state an 
offense is based on our holding in United States v. Panarella 
that “for purposes of Rule 12(b)(2), a charging document fails 
to state an offense if the specific facts alleged in the charging 
document fall beyond the scope of the relevant criminal 
statute, as a matter of statutory interpretation.”  277 F.3d 678, 
685 (3d Cir. 2002).  But after we decided Panarella, Rule 
12(b)(2) was re-numbered as Rule 12(b)(3)(B).  United States 
v. Al Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 586 n.6 (3d Cir. 2004).  Thus, 
our discussion proceeds under Rule 12(b)(3)(B), which 
provides that “at any time while the case is pending, the court 





  After holding a hearing and ordering 
supplemental briefing, the District Court denied Stock‟s 
motion to dismiss.  Although the District Court concluded 
that a threat must evince an intent to injure in the present or 
                                              
3
 To the extent that Stock initially suggested that his 
statement was protected by the First Amendment, App. at 65, 
he subsequently disclaimed that argument before the District 
Court, id. at 125, 254.  Stock also abandoned that issue in his 
Opening Brief by affirmatively directing us to avoid 
“grappl[ing] with the constitutional implications of the 
statements in the indictment.”  Opening Br. at 26 n.5 
(citations omitted); see also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 
182 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding, where the appellant only 
suggested the existence of an issue “in passing in a short 
footnote in the[] opening brief, without argument or relevant 
citation,” that the appellant had abandoned the issue on 
appeal); United States v. Jongewaard, 567 F.3d 336, 339 n.2 
(8th Cir. 2009) (noting, where a defendant “expressly 
disclaims any challenge . . . under the First Amendment,” that 
a court “need not address the question whether [the] 
statements . . . contained a true threat rather than 
constitutionally protected speech”).  Indeed, we understand 
Stock‟s passing references to the First Amendment to make 
the reasonable point that because his statement is not a 
“threat” within the ordinary meaning of that word as it is used 
in 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), it cannot possibly be within the subset 
of “true threats” that are unprotected by the First Amendment.  
Opening Br. at 25; App. at 200-01 ¶ 1. 
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future, the court also determined that a reasonable jury could 
find that Stock‟s statement was a threat. 
 Stock then executed a plea agreement with the 
Government pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11(c)(1)(C), in which he generally waived his appellate 
rights, but specifically preserved his right to seek review of 
the District Court‟s denial of his motion to dismiss.  The 
District Court accepted Stock‟s guilty plea and imposed a 
term of imprisonment of one year and one day and a term of 
supervised release of two years.  Stock timely appealed. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Stock‟s case 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction over his 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We apply a mixed standard of review to a district 
court‟s decision on a motion to dismiss an indictment, 
exercising plenary review over legal conclusions and clear 
error review over factual findings.  United States v. Huet, 665 
F.3d 588, 594 (3d Cir. 2012).  In this appeal, Stock attacks the 
sufficiency of his indictment, presenting a legal question over 
which we have plenary review.  United States v. McGeehan, 
584 F.3d 560, 565 (3d Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 
625 F.3d 159, 159 (3d Cir. 2010).  In particular, Stock 
challenges the sufficiency of his indictment on the basis that 
the specific facts alleged therein fall outside the scope of the 
relevant criminal statute as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, and statutory interpretation is a legal question 
over which we have plenary review.  United States v. Zavrel, 
 8 
384 F.3d 130, 132 (3d Cir. 2004).  Therefore, we exercise 
plenary review over this appeal. 
III. 
In this appeal, both parties ascribe errors to the District 
Court‟s opinion.  The Government argues that the indictment 
is facially sufficient and that the term “threat” in § 875(c) 
does not include a temporal element.  Stock, in turn, asserts 
that the issue of whether his statement is a threat is a question 
of law and that his statement does not express an intent to 
injure in the present or future.  We address these points 
below. 
A. 
 In reviewing Stock‟s motion to dismiss, the District 
Court considered whether the word “threat” in § 875(c) 
contains a temporal component.  The Government argues that 
this analysis was unnecessary because Stock‟s indictment is 
facially sufficient.  We disagree. 
 Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c)(1), an 
indictment “must be a plain, concise, and definite written 
statement of the essential facts constituting the offense 
charged.”  It is true that “[a]n indictment returned by a legally 
constituted and unbiased grand jury, . . . if valid on its face, is 
enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits.”  Huet, 
665 F.3d at 594-95 (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted).  
A facially sufficient indictment “(1) contains the elements of 
the offense intended to be charged, (2) sufficiently apprises 
the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and 
 9 
(3) allows the defendant to show with accuracy to what extent 
he may plead a former acquittal or conviction in the event of 
a subsequent prosecution.”  Id. at 595 (quotation omitted).  
Usually, a recitation of the statutory language satisfies the 
first requirement, “so long as there is sufficient factual 
orientation to permit a defendant to prepare his defense and 
invoke double jeopardy.”  Id. (quotation omitted).  And 
typically, a factual orientation that includes a specification of 
the time period of the alleged offense is sufficient for the 
second and third requirements.  Id.  In short, “detailed 
allegations” are unnecessary.  Id. at 594. 
 Under Rule 12(b)(3)(B), a defendant may contest the 
sufficiency of an indictment on the basis that it “fails . . . to 
state an offense” in at least two ways.  First, a defendant may 
contend that an indictment is insufficient on the basis that it 
does not satisfy the first requirement in that it “fails to charge 
an essential element of the crime.”  Huet, 665 F.3d at 595 
(citation omitted).  Second, because an indictment that merely 
“recites in general terms the essential elements of the offense” 
does not satisfy the second and third requirements, a 
defendant may also claim that an indictment fails to state an 
offense on the basis that “the specific facts alleged . . . fall 
beyond the scope of the relevant criminal statute, as a matter 
 10 
of statutory interpretation.”4  United States v. Panarella, 277 
F.3d 678, 685 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 The Government asks us to ignore the statutory 
interpretation issue because, according to the Government, 
the indictment is facially sufficient.  The Government relies 
on Huet, in which we were asked to decide whether a district 
court may find facts in ruling on a motion to dismiss an 
indictment for failure to state an offense under Rule 
12(b)(3)(B).  Responding in the negative, we reversed the 
district court‟s dismissal of the indictment, which we 
concluded was facially sufficient. 
 However, Huet is distinguishable because the “only 
potential question of statutory interpretation” in that case was 
“not at issue on appeal.”  665 F.3d at 597 n.7.  For that 
reason, we had no need to address “whether the facts alleged 
in the indictment f[e]ll beyond the scope of the relevant 
criminal statute as a matter of statutory interpretation.”  Id. at 
597 (citing, inter alia, Panarella, 277 F.3d at 685).  
                                              
4
 A court‟s review of a motion to dismiss an 
indictment “is a narrow, limited analysis geared only towards 
ensuring that legally deficient charges do not go to a jury.”  
Bergrin, 650 F.3d at 268.  The court‟s ruling “is not . . . a 
permissible vehicle for addressing the sufficiency of the 
government‟s evidence.”  Id. at 265 (quotation omitted).  
Thus, the court determines “whether the facts alleged in the 
indictment, if accepted as entirely true, state the elements of 
an offense and could result in a guilty verdict.”  Id. at 268 
(citation omitted). 
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Nonetheless, we reaffirmed that a defendant may attack the 
sufficiency of an indictment on that basis.  Id. at 595. 
 Here, Stock is making the unmade challenge in Huet – 
namely, that “as a matter of law, the indictment fails to state 
an offense,” Opening Br. at 13, because “the statements 
alleged in the indictment are not „threats‟ and thus fall beyond 
the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c),” id. at 12.  Our precedent has 
recognized such attacks as an appropriate, alternative way in 
which to challenge the sufficiency of an indictment.  See 
McGeehan, 584 F.3d at 565 (“The sufficiency of an 
indictment may be challenged not only on the basis that it 
fails to charge the essential elements of the statutory offense, 
but also on the ground that „the specific facts alleged . . . fall 
beyond the scope of the relevant criminal statute, as a matter 
of statutory interpretation.‟” (emphasis added) (quoting 
Panarella, 277 F.3d at 685)).  Thus, the District Court did not 
err in considering whether the term “threat” in § 875(c) 
includes a temporal element, a question to which we now 
turn. 
B. 
 The District Court concluded that the word “threat” in 
§ 875(c) means an “„express[ion of] an intention to inflict 
injury at once or in the future.‟”  App. at 10 (quoting Zavrel, 
 12 
384 F.3d at 136).
5
  The Government counters that, under 
controlling precedent, the term “threat” in § 875(c) is “a 
                                              
5
 We agree with the Government that the District Court 
incorrectly concluded that we adopted a definition of the term 
“threat” in United States v. Zavrel, 384 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 
2004).  There, we reviewed a district court‟s denial of a 
defendant‟s motion for judgment of acquittal, considering 
whether the mailing of a substance resembling anthrax 
constituted a communication containing a “threat” under 18 
U.S.C. § 876(c).  The defendant argued that her 
communications were immediately, not prospectively, 
harmful, and that threats were limited to prospective, not 
immediate, harm.  We observed that the district court had 
defined the word “threat” as: 
“[A] serious statement or communication which 
expresses an intention to inflict injury at once or 
in the future as distinguished from idle or 
careless talk, exaggeration or something said in 
a joking manner.  A statement or 
communication is a threat if it was made under 
such circumstances that a reasonable person 
hearing or reading the statement or receiving 
the communication would understand it as a 
serious expression of an intent to inflict injury.” 
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statement made by a speaker who „means to communicate a 
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual or group.‟”  Response Br. 
at 28 (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)).  
We hold that the word “threat” in § 875(c) encompasses only 
communications expressing an intent to inflict injury in the 
present or future. 
 The Government‟s proffered definition of the word 
“threat” is pulled from precedent concerning whether certain 
communications constitute “true threats” unprotected by the 
First Amendment.  The Supreme Court‟s true threat 
jurisprudence originated in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 
705 (1969) (per curiam).  There, the defendant was charged 
with making a “threat” to harm the president in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 871(a).  In reversing the denial of the defendant‟s 
motion for judgment of acquittal, the Court instructed that a 
statute that “makes criminal a form of pure speech[] must be 
interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment 
clearly in mind.”  Id. at 707.  Thus, the Court held that a 
threat statute may criminalize only “a true „threat,‟” id. at 
                                                                                                     
Id. at 136 (quotation omitted).  Although “[w]e believe[d] this 
to be the correct approach,” we declined “to decide the issue 
definitively,” because even if we accepted the defendant‟s 
assertion that a threat must relate to future harm, we 
determined that the defendant‟s communications did threaten 
future harm.  Id.  Thus, we did not resolve in Zavrel whether 
the term “threat” in a federal threat statute includes a 
temporal element. 
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708, which “must be distinguished from . . . constitutionally 
protected speech,” id. at 707. 
 Contrary to the Government‟s contention, the 
definition of the word “threat” and the definition of the phrase 
“true threat” are not co-extensive.  To be sure, Watts taught us 
to interpret threat statutes in light of the First Amendment.  
But by distinguishing a “true threat” from a “threat” that 
would otherwise fall within the scope of a statute were it not 
protected by the First Amendment, Watts shows that “true 
threats” are a specific subset of “threats.”  Thus, the plain 
meaning of a “threat” under § 875(c) is distinct from the 
constitutional meaning of a “true threat” under the First 
Amendment.
6
  See United States v. Jongewaard, 567 F.3d 
336, 339 & n.2 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that because the 
defendant argued that § 875(c), not the First Amendment, 
required that a communication be made to achieve a goal 
through intimidation in order to constitute a threat, the court 
did not need to address the question of whether the statement 
constituted a true threat); United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 
1492, 1493 (6th Cir. 1997) (concluding that “the indictment 
failed, as a matter of law, to allege violations of Section 
875(c),” and accordingly declining “to address the First 
Amendment issues raised by the parties”); United States v. 
Havelock, 664 F.3d 1284, 1304 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) 
                                              
6
 For this reason, we will not rely on the definition of a 
“true threat” as “a serious expression of an intention to inflict 
bodily harm” that we adopted in United States v. Kosma, 951 
F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991) (emphasis omitted) (quotation 
omitted). 
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(Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(explaining that because the communications “were not a 
threat in any sense of the word,” there was no need to “reach 
the [First Amendment] question”). 
 The Government also claims that the ordinary meaning 
of the word “threat” in § 875(c) does not contain a temporal 
component.  Section 875(c) prohibits the “trans[mission] in 
interstate . . . commerce [of] any communication containing 
. . . any threat to injure the person of another.”  The term 
“threat” was not defined by congress in § 875(c) or in any of 
the related federal threat statutes.  See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 
871-880. 
 Our interpretation of the word “threat” in § 875(c) 
begins with an inquiry into “whether the language used has a 
plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular 
dispute in the case.”  Zavrel, 384 F.3d at 133 (quotation 
omitted); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 
(1979) (“A fundamental canon of statutory construction is 
that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as 
taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” 
(citation omitted)).  When § 875(c) was last amended in 1994, 
one definition of the term “threat” expressly included a 
temporal element.  See Black‟s Law Dictionary 1480 (6th ed. 
1990) (“The term, „threat‟ means an avowed present 
determination or intent to injure presently or in the future.” 
(emphasis added)).  While other definitions did not do so 
explicitly, see, e.g., id. (“[A threat is a] communicated intent 
to inflict physical or other harm on any person or on 
property.”), they did so implicitly by defining “threat” with 
reference to the speaker‟s “intent,” which is an inherently 
 16 
prospective concept, see id. at 810 (defining the word “intent” 
as “[a] state of mind in which a person seeks to accomplish a 
given result through a course of action”).  Thus, the plain 
meaning of the word “threat” in § 875(c) suggests that it is 
confined to communications expressing an intent to injure in 
the present or future. 
 This conclusion is confirmed by a consideration of the 
“placement and purpose” of the term “threat” in § 875(c).  
Zavrel, 384 F.3d at 134 (quotation omitted).  Turning to the 
placement of the word “threat,” the Government argues that 
Congress criminalized “any threat,” which includes past as 
well as present and future threats.  The Government cites 
cases from two other courts of appeals adopting an expansive 
understanding of the noun “threat” based on the adjective 
“any.”  In United States v. Jeffries, the Sixth Circuit held that 
a music video was a threatening communication under 
§ 875(c) because “the statute covers „any threat,‟ making no 
distinction between threats delivered orally (in person, by 
phone) or in writing (letters, emails, faxes), by video or by 
song, in old-fashioned ways or in the most up-to-date.”  692 
F.3d 473, 482 (6th Cir. 2012).  And in Jongewaard, the 
Eighth Circuit held that a threatening communication under § 
875(c) need not be made to effect some change through 
intimidation because the phrase “any threat” “criminalizes a 
broad spectrum of threats to injure the person of another.”  
567 F.3d at 340. 
 Jeffries and Jongewaard do not advance the 
Government‟s argument for several reasons.  First, neither the 
Sixth Circuit nor the Eighth Circuit analyzed whether the 
word “threat” in § 875(c) contains a temporal component, 
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since the communications in those cases were expressly 
prospective.  Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 475-77; Jongewaard, 567 
F.3d at 338.  Second, and more significantly, the adjective 
“any” can broaden the scope of the noun “threat” to its natural 
boundary, but not beyond.  Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1495 (“To 
emphasize the use of the term „any‟ without acknowledging 
the limitation imposed by the term „threat‟ ignores the intent 
of Congress.”).  And third, Jeffries and Jongewaard lend 
some support to an interpretation limiting the term “threat” to 
communications revealing an intent to injure in the present or 
future by demonstrating that such a definition would “not 
render the word „any‟ superfluous.”  Havelock, 664 F.3d at 
1291 (citing Duncan v. Walker, 553 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)).  
Thus, the placement of the word “threat” within § 875(c) does 
not counsel an interpretation contrary to the plain meaning of 
that term. 
 Pushing on to the purpose of § 875(c), the Government 
voices two concerns about cabining the word “threat” to its 
plain meaning.  The Government first points out that the 
purpose of the true threat exception to the First Amendment is 
to “protect[] individuals from the fear of violence, from the 
disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that 
the threatened violence will occur.”  Response Br. at 30 
(quoting Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 478).  But even if the purposes 
of § 875(c) are identical to the purposes of the true threat 
exception to the First Amendment, one of those purposes is 
expressly prospective.  See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 
505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (explaining that the reason true 
threats are outside the First Amendment is to protect people 
“from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur” 
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(emphasis added)).  With respect to the other two purposes, a 
communication demonstrating an intent to injure in the past 
may excite some fear of violence and may engender some 
disruption from that fear.  But the quantum of fear and the 
level of disruption experienced by the victim would usually 
be less for an expression of an intent to injure in the past than 
in the present or future.  For example, it seems 
uncontroversial that the statement, “I tried to murder you 
yesterday, but I will never do so again,” would normally 
provoke less fear and disruption than the statement, “I will 
murder you tomorrow.” 
 The Government further posits that because we apply 
an objective test to determine whether a communication is a 
true threat, United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d 
Cir. 1991), under which the speaker need only have a general 
intent to communicate his statement, United States v. 
 19 
Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1994),
7
 “it cannot 
matter when, in a temporal sense, the defendant intended to 
injure the victim,” Response Br. at 32.  Again assuming the 
applicability of the true threat test to the definition of the term 
“threat,” the sender‟s intent would normally be indiscernible 
to a reasonable recipient, while the retrospective or 
prospective nature of the message would typically be obvious 
to a reasonable recipient.  Thus, the purposes of § 875(c) do 
not conflict with the plain meaning of the word “threat.” 
                                              
7
 In Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court stated that 
“„[t]rue threats‟ encompass those statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an 
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular 
individual or group of individuals.”  538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).  Some courts of appeals 
have suggested that this language establishes a new subjective 
standard under which the speaker must have the specific 
intent that his statement be threatening, see, e.g., United 
States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1116-18 (9th Cir. 
2011); United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 498-500 (7th Cir. 
2008), while others have reaffirmed the traditional objective 
standard, see, e.g., United States v. Nicklas, 713 F.3d 435, 
439-40 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 
473, 479-81 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. White, 670 F.3d 
498, 508-12 (4th Cir. 2012).  Although we have continued to 
apply the objective test, see, e.g., Zavrel, 384 F.3d at 135-37, 
we have not yet considered whether Black called into 
question our precedent on the issue, and Stock does not ask us 
to do so here. 
 20 
 Our interpretation of the term “threat” in § 875(c) is 
also consistent with the reasoning of the other courts of 
appeals that have addressed this issue.  For example, in 
Havelock, the defendant was convicted of mailing, a half hour 
before opening kickoff, communications threatening to injure 
spectators at the Super Bowl, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
876(c).  On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court 
erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the basis that the 
indictment alleged insufficient facts to state an offense 
“because the communications did not threaten to injure 
immediately or in the future, but instead contained a „post-
mortem confession or explanation of his actions, which never 
came to fruition,‟” and so “were devoid of a „threat to 
injure.‟”  664 F.3d at 1288.  A three-judge minority, 
concurring in the majority‟s judgment, but dissenting from its 
rationale for reversing the convictions,
8
 determined that the 
word “threat” is “by definition prospective,” id. at 1305 
(Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citation omitted), because that term is defined as “an 
„indication of impending danger or harm,‟” id. (quoting 
United States v. Davila, 461 F.3d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 2006)).  
                                              
8
 The defendant also argued that the district court erred 
in denying his motion to dismiss on the basis that the 
indictment alleged insufficient facts to state an offense 
because the word “person” in § 876(c) referred only to natural 
people and the alleged communications were addressed to 
corporations.  Because the majority reversed the convictions 
on this basis, it did not address the defendant‟s alternative 
argument. 
 21 
In other words, the minority would have ruled that threats 
“may include announcements of future or impending action, 
but not statements regarding past events or retrospective 
harm.”  Id.  According to the minority: 
“Having deposited the [communications] in a 
United States Postal Service mailbox on the 
very day of the Superbowl, a mere thirty 
minutes before his intended rampage at the 
stadium, [the defendant‟s] [communications] 
could not have reached [their] intended 
destinations in time to put the recipients in fear 
of imminent danger or to constitute a threat of 
future action.” 
Id. at 1305-06.  For this reason, the minority would have held 
that the communications “did not contain a threat.”  Id. at 
1307. 
 Further, in United States v. Landham, 251 F.3d 1072 
(6th Cir. 2001), the Sixth Circuit reached the same result, 
albeit under a true threat analysis.  There, the defendant was 
convicted of, inter alia, transmitting a threat in interstate 
commerce in violation of § 875(c) based on his statement, 
“I’ve done more to you with a Parker 51 than what happened 
to your father with a goddamn Taurus five-shot.”  Id. at 1082 
(emphasis added).  On appeal, the defendant argued that the 
district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the 
indictment because the alleged statement was not a true 
threat.  Reasoning that it was “self-evident that [the 
defendant] [wa]s referring to damaging remarks he had 
previously made by transmitting written communications,” 
 22 
the Sixth Circuit determined that the alleged statement 
“refer[red] to past conduct, not present or future conduct.”  Id.  
Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the statement was “not 
a „communication containing a threat,‟” and held that “the 
indictment failed, as a matter of law, to allege a violation of 
§ 875(c).”9  Id.  Based on our own statutory interpretation and 
this persuasive authority, we hold that the term “threat” in § 
875(c) refers to the expression of an intent to inflict injury in 




 Notwithstanding the District Court‟s adoption of 
Stock‟s preferred definition of the word “threat,” the court 
determined that the case “d[id] not turn on the statutory 
construction of section 875(c),” because “a reasonable jury 
could conclude that the communication posted by Defendant 
on Craigslist constituted a threat.”  App. at 13 (citing Huet, 
665 F.3d at 596).  According to Stock, this conclusion was 
                                              
9
 As an alternative basis for its holding, the court 
reasoned that “even if the statement were a veiled threat, it 
was not an intent to inflict bodily harm” because “[a] Parker 
fifty-one is a fountain pen.”  United States v. Landham, 251 
F.3d 1072, 1082 (6th Cir. 2001). 
10
 The parties cite countless cases to support their 
competing definitions, some of which include, and others of 
which do not include, a temporal element.  We find these 
cases, which do not directly address the issue, to be of little 
value here. 
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erroneous because “[a] determination of whether the facts set 
forth in the indictment are „threats‟ as used in § 875(c) 
presents a question of law, not a question of fact for a jury.”  
Opening Br. at 24 (citations omitted).
11
  Although we hold 
that a court may conclude that a communication does not 
constitute a threat as a matter of law in certain cases, we are 
also satisfied that the District Court recognized its ability to 
do so here. 
 In the usual case, whether a communication constitutes 
a threat or a true threat “is a matter to be decided by the trier 
of fact.”  Kosma, 951 F.2d at 555 (citations omitted); see also 
United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 512 (4th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 497 (7th Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Floyd, 458 F.3d 844, 848-49 (8th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392, 397 (10th Cir. 1999); 
United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994).  
Nonetheless, “[a] few cases may be so clear . . . that they can 
be resolved as a matter of law.”  Kosma, 951 F.2d at 555 
(quoting United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458, 462-63 (9th 
                                              
11
 In the Government‟s view, “Stock fails to develop 
this argument and, therefore it is waived.”  Response Br. at 25 
(citation omitted).  We disagree.  Stock‟s argument is 
supported by citations to five cases and takes up a full page of 
the argument section of his brief.  See Opening Br. at 24-25; 
cf. United States v. Rawlins, 606 F.3d 73, 82 n.11 (3d Cir. 
2010) (determining that a challenge was waived where it was 
suggested in the statement of issues section of a brief but was 
not developed in the argument section of the brief). 
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Cir. 1984)); see also Viefhaus, 168 F.3d at 397; Malik, 16 
F.3d at 51. 
 It is not unprecedented for a court to conclude that a 
communication does not legally qualify as a threat or a true 
threat.  Indeed, in Watts, the Supreme Court held as a matter 
of law that the defendant‟s statement was merely “political 
hyperbole” that did not fit within the definition of the phrase 
“true „threat.‟”  394 U.S. at 708.  Additionally, in Landham, 
the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court‟s denial of the 
defendant‟s motion to dismiss, concluding that “the 
indictment failed, as a matter of law, to allege a violation of 
§ 875(c)” since the alleged statement was “not a 
„communication containing a [true] threat.‟”  251 F.3d at 
1082. 
 Especially relevant is the decision in Alkhabaz, where 
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court‟s dismissal of the 
indictment charging the defendant with violations of § 875(c).  
Ruling that a communication cannot constitute a threat unless 
it is made to achieve a goal through intimidation, and 
reasoning that the defendant‟s messages did not satisfy this 
requirement, the court concluded that those messages “d[id] 
not constitute „communications containing a threat‟ under 
Section 875(c).”  104 F.3d at 1496.  Thus, the Sixth Circuit 
held that the indictment “fail[ed] to set forth . . . all the 
elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be 
punished and [had to] be dismissed as a matter of law.”  Id. 
(emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted).  In light of this 
precedent, we reaffirm that a court may properly dismiss an 
indictment as a matter of law if it concludes that no 
reasonable jury could find that the alleged communication 
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constitutes a threat or a true threat.  See Huet, 665 F.3d at 
596. 
 Here, the record reflects that the District Court clearly 
recognized its authority to dismiss the indictment as a matter 
of law.  App. at 13 (“The Court does not foreclose the 
possibility that an indictment charging an individual with a 
violation of section 875(c) may „fall beyond the scope of the 
relevant criminal statute, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation‟ if the „specific facts‟ charged in such an 
indictment are clearly deficient.” (quoting Huet, 665 F.3d at 
595)).  The District Court simply declined to exercise this 
authority because it determined that “reasonable jurors could 
certainly conclude that these statements constitute „a serious 
statement or communication which expresses an intention to 
inflict injury‟ on JKP „at once or in the future.‟”  Id. at 15 
(quoting Zavrel, 384 F.3d at 136).  We agree that, based on 
this underlying determination, the District Court properly 
concluded that the question necessarily became one of fact for 
the jury to resolve.  The propriety of the District Court‟s 
underlying determination is the final issue we now address. 
D. 
 The District Court determined that “a reasonable jury 
could conclude that the communication posted by Defendant 
on Craigslist constituted a threat” based on a consideration of 
the alleged statement “as a whole, and in the context in which 
the statements were made.”  App. at 13 (citing Huet, 665 F.3d 
at 596).  Stock, however, claims that, “viewed in its 
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entirety,”12 the alleged posting reveals only “statements that 
describe past conduct with an intent to harm, followed by a 
statement indicating a resignation or abandonment of 
purpose, followed, in turn, by expressions of ill wishes and 
hopes,” and does not evidence an intent to injure in the 
present or future.  Opening Br. at 21.  We conclude that a 
reasonable jury could find that the posting, in context and as a 
whole, constitutes a threatening communication. 
 At the outset, Stock contends that the District Court 
erred in “assum[ing] the truth not just of the making of the 
statement, but of the content of the statement.”13  Opening Br. 
                                              
12
 Normally, we look at the context and totality of a 
communication to determine whether it constitutes a true 
threat outside the protection of the First Amendment.  See 
United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 154 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Nonetheless, Stock adopts this test in asserting that the 
posting does not constitute a threat within the meaning of 
§ 875(c).  See Reply Br. at 5 (“[V]iewed in their entirety and 
in context, the statements in the indictment fall beyond the 
scope of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).”).  We agree that this standard, 
which is irrelevant to the definition of the phrase “true threat” 
but relevant to the test of whether a communication meets 
that definition, is the appropriate inquiry to apply in deciding 
whether Stock‟s posting is an expression of an intent to injure 
in the present or future. 
13
 Again, the Government insists that Stock waived 
this argument by neglecting to develop it.  Response Br. at 
25.  Again, we disagree.  See Opening Br. at 26-27; cf. 
Rawlins, 606 F.3d at 82 n.11. 
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at 24.  In other words, Stock believes that the District Court 
erroneously assumed that he actually engaged in the conduct 
described in the first sentence of his posting.  “In evaluating a 
Rule 12 motion to dismiss, a district court must accept as true 
the factual allegations set forth in the indictment.”  Huet, 665 
F.3d at 595 (emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, United States 
v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 78-79 (1962)).  Here, the only fact 
alleged in the indictment was that Stock “posted a notice on 
Craig‟s List, an Internet web site, that contained [specific] 
statements.”  App. at 50.  The description of certain conduct 
was part of the statement that Stock allegedly made, not a 
second factual allegation.  Thus, under normal circumstances, 
we would agree that, to the extent the District Court assumed 
that the communication was an admission of the conduct 
described therein, it did so in error. 
 Here, however, even if the District Court committed 
the alleged error, it is doubtful that the error affected the 
court‟s analysis.  As the court correctly observed, “an 
objective test is applied to determine whether the Defendant‟s 
statements constitute a threat under section 875(c).”  App. at 
14 (citations omitted); see also Kosma, 951 F.2d at 559.  
Since Stock does not even argue that the statement was a joke 
or political hyperbole, it is obvious that a reasonable person 
would be entitled to believe not only that Stock made the 
statement, but also that the statement accurately described his 
conduct.  Thus, Stock‟s sole remaining claim of error is that 
the District Court incorrectly interpreted his statement. 
 According to Stock, his first sentence: 
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“i went home loaded in my truck and spend the 
past 3 hours looking for this douche with the 
expressed intent of crushing him in that little 
piece of shit under cover gray impala hooking 
up my tow chains and dragging his stupid ass 
down to creek hills and just drowning him in 
the falls,” 
App. at 50 (emphasis omitted), “unambiguously refer[s] to a 
situation past and cannot amount to [a] threat[],” Opening Br. 
at 23 (citations omitted).  We agree that this statement, by 
itself, reveals only an “expressed intent” to injure in “the past 
3 hours,” and so does not constitute a threat.  See Landham, 
251 F.3d at 1082-83 (holding that a statement that refers only 
to past conduct does not constitute a true threat).  But the first 
sentence does not stand alone; it provides context for the four 
sentences that follow.  See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 
(considering whether a communication constitutes a true 
threat “in context”).  And in the right context, an expression 
of an intent to injure in the past may be circumstantial 
evidence of an intent to injure in the present or future.  See 
United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(holding that speech that “used past incidents to instill fear in 
future targets” constituted true threats when “viewed in 
context”). 
 Stock argues that his second sentence, “but alas i can‟t 
fine that bastard anywhere,” App. at 50 (emphasis omitted), 
“describes a resignation of purpose or abandonment of that 
[prior] intent,” Opening Br. at 19.  But Stock‟s suggested 
reading of this statement is only one possible interpretation.  
We believe that a jury could reasonably find, from his use of 
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the present tense in the second sentence together with his 
description of his past conduct in the first sentence, that Stock 
had not abandoned his prior intent, but that he still harbored a 
present intent that he was unable to fulfill at that time.  See 
Himelwright, 42 F.3d at 782 (explaining that a determination 
of whether statements constitute true threats does not depend 
on the speaker‟s “ability at the time to carry out the threats” 
(citations omitted)). 
 This alternative understanding of the second sentence 
becomes even more reasonable in light of the last three 
sentences:  “i really wish he would die, just like the rest of 
these stupid fucking asshole cops.  so J.K.P. if you read this i 
hope you burn in hell.  i only wish i could have been the one 
to send you there.”  App. at 50 (emphasis omitted).  These 
three sentences confirm that at the time Stock made the 
posting, he still desired J.K.P.‟s death.  Moreover, in the 
context of the first and second sentences, a reasonable jury 
could have found that when he made the posting, not only did 
Stock desire J.K.P.‟s death, but that if he found him, he would 
execute his intent, possibly by the means he had previously 
employed. 
 Stock asserts that this reading of the final three 
sentences is flawed for two reasons.  First, he alleges that 
“[t]hese expressions do not suggest that Mr. Stock himself 
would harm J.K.P.”  Opening Br. at 20 (citations omitted).  
We have said that a significant factor in evaluating whether a 
communication is a true threat is whether a speaker identifies 
himself as the person who will inflict injury on another or 
whether the speaker merely suggests that harm will befall 
another by someone‟s hand.  See Kosma, 951 F.2d at 554.  
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Here, Stock‟s statement that he wished he could have been 
the one to kill J.K.P. arguably implies that Stock would not be 
the one to do so.  However, Stock‟s earlier statement that he 
was disappointed that he could not find J.K.P., arguably 
implies the opposite, namely, that if he could find J.K.P., he 
would be the one to kill him.  Thus, a jury could reasonably 
find that Stock implicated himself as the person who would 
kill J.K.P.  See id. at 554 n.8 (holding that a conditional threat 
may constitute a true threat). 
 Second, Stock claims that the final three sentences are 
“expressions of a hope and a wish that harm would come to 
J.K.P.,” Opening Br. at 20, and that “[m]erely wishing[] or 
hoping that harm would come to another falls outside the 
scope of the statute,” id. (quotation omitted).  The authority 
on whether a wish can constitute a threat is divided.  
Compare United States v. Christenson, 653 F.3d 697, 701-02 
(8th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the argument that simply expressing 
a wish that a person suffer harm cannot constitute a true 
threat) with United States v. Daulong, 60 F. Supp. 235, 236 
(W.D. La. 1945) (holding that a federal threat statute “d[id] 
not penalize the imagining, wishing or hoping that the act 
w[ould] be committed by someone else”).  Stock has offered 
no reason, and we can think of none, why a wish could not 
constitute a threat in the right context.  Applying Stock‟s 
requested rule would be especially inappropriate here 
because, in the context of the first and second sentences, a 
reasonable jury could find that Stock did not simply wish that 
J.K.P. would suffer harm, but that he was prepared to commit 
the act himself. 
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 Before concluding our discussion, we take this 
opportunity to comment on the unique procedural challenge 
posed by this particular case.  While a court‟s review of a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3)(B) is limited to a 
consideration of the facts alleged in the indictment, Huet, 665 
F.3d at 595-96, the court‟s determination of whether a 
statement constitutes a threat under § 875(c) is based on the 
context and totality of the communication, Fullmer, 584 F.3d 
at 154.  Thus, “[a]lthough the Government is not required to 
set forth its entire case in the indictment,” Huet, 665 F.3d at 
595, it is at least “incumbent on the Government to make that 
context clear” in an indictment charging a violation of a threat 
statute, Landham, 251 F.3d at 1080.  Here, we are satisfied 
that the Government included sufficient context in the 
indictment for the District Court to determine that a 
reasonable jury could find that Stock‟s statement expressed 
an intent to injure in the present or future. 
IV. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the 
District Court‟s denial of Stock‟s motion to dismiss the 
indictment pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3)(B) for failure to state an 
offense under § 875(c). 
